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Abstract: The study examined the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in Nigeria. The 
study specifically investigate the extent to which board size affect firm performance; investigate the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance; ascertain the extent to which 
ownership structure influence firm performance; examine the relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm performance for the period of five years which covered 2013 to 2017. Data were 
sourced from Annual report and statement of financial accounts of the selected companies. Panel Data 
econometric technique which included least squares dummy variable (LSDV), random effect model 
and Hausman tests were employed. The model adopted return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) as the dependent variables while Ownership structure (OWNSTR), Board independence 
(BIND), Board size (BSIZE) and Board gender diversity (BGD) were used as the explanatory variables 
to capture corporate governance. The study found that board independence (BIND) has positive effect 
on return on asset while Ownership structure (OWNSTR), Board size (BSIZE) and Board gender 
diversity (BGD) on return on asset. The study further revealed that all the explanatory variables that is, 
Ownership structure (OWNSTR), Board independence (BIND), Board size (BSIZE) and Board gender 
diversity (BGD) have significant and positive effect on return on equity. The study concluded that 
corporate governance have significant effect on return on equity and it was recommended that size of 
the board (membership) should be increased but not exceeding the maximum number specified by the 
code of corporate governance for banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is concerned about accountability, boards, disclosure, investor 
involvement and related issues which suggests that the performance of an entity is 
to a large extent is determined by the composition of board. Corporate governance 
is therefore concerned with the creation of a balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals (Udeh, Abiahu & Tambou, 2017). 
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To achieve this, there is the need to encourage efficient use of resources, 
accountability in the use of power and the alignment of the interest of the various 
stakeholders, such as, individuals, corporations and the society.  
The recent financial crisis that hit the globe in the twenty-first century necessitated 
the move for good corporate governance practices in corporations. Nielson (2000) 
opines that the common denominator of these monumental failures was poor 
corporate governance culture. While, Ajagbe (2007) put forward that in poor 
corporate management, fraud and insider abuse of power by management and board 
of directors is commonly placed. There is however, a unanimous agreement that the 
key outcome of poor corporate governance is earnings smoothing. However, poor 
corporate governance practices invariably result to failure of firms (Enofe & Isiavwe, 
2012). Such significant failures have brought to the fore the need for a deeper 
understanding of the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. The most 
important aspect to structure the firm appropriately whether it’s in Asia, Europe, 
Africa is to implement the right governance mechanisms in order to help businesses 
in the process of decision making (Ahmed & Hamdan, 2015).  
The study of Ajala, Amuda and Arulogun, (2012); Lubabah and Bawa (2013); 
Adekunle & Aghedo (2014); Ahmed and Hamdan, (2015); Ilaboya and Obaretin 
(2015); Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy (2016); Udeh, Abiahu and Tambou (2017) to 
mention but a few concluded both positive and negative effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance. This implies that there is inconsistency in 
empirical study on corporate governance and firm performance which necessitates 
further study. It is noted that majority of these studies focused on either only financial 
institutions or non financial institutions. It was also pointed out that the nature of the 
performance measures used could also be responsible for such inconsistency. It is in 
this regards, that the present study investigate the effects of corporate governance on 
firm performance in Nigeria by focusing on both financial institutions and non 
financial institutions as a means to measure performance with ROA and ROE 
respectively. The objective of the study is therefore to examine the effects of 
corporate governance on firm performance in Nigeria while the specific objectives 
are to: investigate the extent to which board size affect firm performance; investigate 
the relationship between board independence and firm performance; ascertain the 
extent to which ownership structure influence firm performance; examine the 
relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The Asian Development Bank defined the corporate governance as the manner in 
which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic 
resources for development (Eng & Mak, 2003; Cheng, 2008). Solomon and Solomon 
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(2004) opined that corporate governance is the basic tool of checks and balances, 
both within and outside to companies, which ensures that firms discharge their 
accountability duty to stakeholders and act in a socially responsible manner. Nielsen 
(2000) reported that corporate governance is the system of rights, structures and 
control mechanisms recognized internally and externally for the management of a 
listed public limited liability company, with the aim of protecting the interests of 
stakeholders. In Nigeria, the governance of a limited liability company is the duty of 
its board of directors. Dozie (2003) believes that corporate governance is 
characterized by transparency, accountability, probity and the protection of 
stakeholders’ rights. Conclusively, what is evident from the various definitions 
reviewed is that corporate governance is the set of structures, processes, cultures and 
systems through which objectives are determined and companies are directed and 
controlled. 
On the other hand, performance is a multi-dimensional construct which varies 
depending on whether the measurement objective is to assess performance outcomes 
or behaviour (Akintonde, 2013). Nnabuife (2009) believed that performance is not 
only a team work but also as an individual efforts resulting into a specific end result 
that will be matched with expected reward by managers. Armstrong in Akintonde, 
(2013) described performance as the outcomes of work because they provide the 
strongest linkage to the strategic goals of the organization, customer satisfaction, and 
economic contributions. Performance could be regarded as behavior i.e. the way in 
which organizations, teams, and individuals get work done. Hornby, Michael, 
Joanna, Diana, Dilys, Patrick and Victoria (2010) see performance as the act or 
process of performing a task, an action that involves a lot of effort, or how well or 
badly you do something or something works.  
Many theories have been propounded to explain the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance in literatures. Some of these theories include agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, shareholder theory, etc. Agency theory contends that as 
firms grow in size the shareholders (principals) lose effective control, leaving 
professional managers (agents), have more information than principals to manage 
the affairs of the business. Since principals do not have access to all available 
information at the time a decision is being made by an agent, they are unable to 
determine whether the agent’s actions are in the best interest of the firm (Jensen & 
Meckling cited in Egbunike & Abiahu, 2017).  
The stakeholders’ theory helps to fill the observed gap created by omission found in 
the agency theory which identifies shareholders as the only interest group of a 
corporate entity. The stakeholder theory provides that the firm is a system of 
stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host society that provides the 
necessary legal and market infrastructure for the firm’s activities (Aminu, Aisha & 
Mohammad, 2015). The stakeholders’ theory proposes that companies have a social 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
85 
responsibility that requires them to consider the interest of all parties affected by 
their actions.  
Olayinka, (2010) investigated the impact of board structure on corporate financial 
performance in Nigeria. The study identified board characteristics as (board 
composition, board size, board ownership and CEO duality) while financial 
performance was measured by return on equity (ROE) and return on capital 
employed (ROCE). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to 
estimate the relationship between board structure and financial performance, 
findings from the study showed that there is strong positive association between 
board size and corporate financial performance. Evidence also revealed that there is 
a positive association between outside directors sitting on the board and corporate 
financial performance. However, a negative association was observed between 
directors’ stockholding and firm financial corporate financial performance. 
However, a negative association was observed between directors’ stockholding and 
firm financial performance measures. In addition, the study reveals a negative 
association between ROE and CEO duality, while a strong positive association was 
observed between ROCE and CEO duality. Ajala, Amuda and Arulogun (2012) 
examined the effects of corporate governance on the performance of Nigerian 
banking sector. The Pearson Correlation and the regression analysis were used to 
find out whether there is a relationship between the corporate governance variables 
and firms performance. The study revealed that a negative but significant 
relationship exists between board size and the financial performance of these banks 
while a positive and significant relationship was also observed between directors’ 
equity interest, level of corporate governance disclosure index and performance of 
the sampled banks.  
Lubabah and Bawa (2013) examined corporate governance and financial 
performance of banks on twelve banks in Nigeria covering a period of five years 
(2006-2010), employing regression analysis, the study found negative relationship 
between board size and profitability of banks. Fanta, Kemal and Waka (2013) 
examined Ethiopian banks between 2005 and 2011 using multivariate regression 
analysis and classical linear regression model, the study found an inverse 
relationship between capital adequacy ratio, bank size; audit committee in the board 
and bank performance. However positive linkage was established between banks’ 
size, capital adequacy ratio; board size and bank’s profitability. On the other hand 
they observed that the existence of audit committee members in the board, ownership 
type, loan loss position and loan to deposit ratio have no significant influence on 
bank performance.  
Akingunola, Adekunle and Adedipe (2013) carried out a study on corporate 
governance and bank’s performance in Nigeria (Post–Bank’s Consolidation). Binary 
probit was adopted to test the covariance matrix computed on structured 
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questionnaire to bank’s clients and it was discovered that the variables such as 
independence, reliance, and fairness helps in the effective performance of banks but 
the major significant ones in this consolidation period are accountability and 
transparency of banks staff. Least square regression was adopted to convey the 
relationship between bank deposits and bank credit. The estimation of the developed 
model found that banks total credit was positively related but not significantly 
determinant factors of bank’s performance, and bank deposit was found to be 
positively related to bank performance. George and Karibo (2014) investigated the 
effect of corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed firms 
in Nigeria: A Content Analysis, a total of 33 firms were selected cutting across three 
sectors: Manufacturing, Financial and Oil & Gas. The study showed that most of the 
corporate governance items were disclosed by the case study firms. The result also 
showed that the banking sector has the highest level of corporate governance 
disclosure compared to the other two sectors. The result thus indicates that the nature 
of control over the sector have an impact on companies’ decision to disclose online 
information about their corporate governance in Nigeria; and that there were no 
significant differences among firms with low corporate governance quotient and 
those with higher corporate governance. 
Osisioma Egbunike and Adeaga (2015) in Nigeria on influence of corporate 
governance on deposit money banks’ performance between 2006 and 2013, the study 
proxied firm performance as ROA while financial soundness indicators of corporate 
governance were capital adequacy ratio, liquidity ratio, loan to deposit ratio, deposit 
money bank lending rate, nonperforming loan to total credit, and cash reserve ratio. 
The study employed Panel regression analysis and it was found that there is no 
statistical significant difference between corporate governance practices among the 
DMBs based on the perceptions of the shareholders and there is significant 
relationship between DMBs’ performance and corporate governance proxy variables 
and also the corporate governance proxy variables have impacted both positively and 
negatively on DMBs’ performance in Nigeria. Ahmed and Hamdan (2015) examined 
the impact of corporate governance characteristics on firm performance in Bahrain 
Stock Exchange. The study sample contained 42 Out of 48 Bahrain’s financial 
companies which are listed in Bahrain Stock Exchange during the period 2007-2011. 
The descriptive results indicated that the sample firms fulfill corporate governance 
variables. The empirical results indicated that performance measures such as return 
on assets and return on equity are significantly related to corporate governance in 
Bahrain. However, earning per share performance measure is not showing any 
significant impact related to corporate governance. Overall, the study found a 
positive influence of corporate governance mechanisms on performance for the 
entire firm in Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy (2016) reviewed the impact of corporate governance 
on the financial performance of all listed deposit money banks in Nigeria for a period 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
87 
of seven (7) years (after consolidation). Data for the study were quantitatively 
retrieved from the annual reports and accounts of the studied banks. The study 
concluded that larger board size contributes positively and significantly to the 
financial performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria.  
Udeh, Abiahu and Tambou (2017) evaluated the impact of board composition as a 
tool of corporate governance on return on capital employed as a tool of firm financial 
performance in Nigeria Quoted Banks. The method of data analysis utilised was 
ordinary least squares regression analysis, the study showed that board composition 
has a negative, though insignificant impacts on ROCE during the 2003 – 2008 period 
(p1) and during the 2009 – 2014 period (p2). The study concluded that the way in 
which corporate governance is organised differs among countries, depending on the 
economic, political and social contexts. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sampling Technique and Model Specification 
Multi-stage sampling technique was used for the study. The first stage involved the 
purposive selection of Nigerian quoted firms on the floor of Nigeria Stock Exchange. 
The second stage was the random sampling selection of three financial institutions 
and two non-financial institutions quoted on the floor of Stock Exchange. Hence, the 
financial institutions included Access bank, Ecobank, and Zenith bank while the non-
financial institutions include Coca-cola company and Dangote Flour.  
The study adapted the model of Abdulhazeez, Ndibel and Mercy (2016) which 
investigate corporate governance and financial performance of listed deposit money 
banks in Nigeria.  
The model is stated as ROA = f (BS, BC, CD, AC, FS) 
Where;  
ROA = Return on Assets proxy for financial performance; BS = Board Size; BC = 
Board Composition; CD = CEO duality; AC = Audit committee; FS = Size of the 
firm 
The study modified the model by replacing all the corporate governance indices with 
the exception of board size. Therefore, with replacement, the corporate governance 
indices become board size, board independence, ownership structure and board 
gender diversity. The justification for the new variables included in the model is to 
give a clearer and better understanding of corporate governance and firm 
performance against the commonly used variables. 
Hence, the model for the study is stated as; 
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Performance = f (corporate governance) 
ROA=f (OWNSTR, BSIZE, BIND, BGD) 
ROE=f (OWNSTR, BSIZE, BIND, BGD) 
The above functions can be mathematically represented as: 
ROAit = β0+ β1BSizet + β2BINDt + β3BGDt + β4OWSTRt + et ………………. (3.1) 
Substitute ROA=ROE into (1) to arrive at; 
ROEit = β0 + β1BSIZEt + β2BINDt + β3BGDt+ β4OWNSTRt + et …………..... (3.2) 
Where; ROA = Return on assets; ROE = Return on equity; OWNSTR = Ownership 
structure; BIND = Board independence; BSIZE = Board size; BGD = Board gender 
diversity 
3.2. Sources of Data, Measurement of Variables and Apriori Expectation 
Data were obtained from secondary source which were collected from the annual 
financial statement of the selected financial and non-financial institutions (Access 
bank, Ecobank, Zenith, Coca-cola company and Dangote Flour) from the period 
2013 to 2017.  
Return on Asset (ROA): Measures the overall efficiency of management and gives 
an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. 
ROA = Profit after Tax/Total Asset  
Return on Equity (ROE): Measures a firm’s financial performance by revealing how 
much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. It 
shows how well the shareholders’ funds are managed and used to generate return. 
ROE = Profit after Tax/Total Equity. 
BDSIZE: Board size is a measure of the number of individuals on the board. It is 
used as proxy for board characteristics of the number of individuals on the board. It 
is expected to have a positive effect. 
BDIND: This represents board independence and it is measured by number of non-
executive directors on the board. It is expected to have a positive effect. 
OWSTRU: This represents ownership structure of the firm. The study used three 
variants of ownership structure namely; foreign ownership, government ownership 
and institutional ownership. It is expected to have a positive effect. 
BGD: This represents board gender diversity. It is the ratio of female director to total 
number of directors. It is expected to have a positive effect. 
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3.3. Method of Data Analysis 
Panel data regression was employed in the study. The panel data regression test is 
divided into three namely; pool OLS, fixed effect model, random effect model and 
Hausman test to justify the best and appropriate model to be adopted. 
3.3.1. The Fixed Effect Model 
The term fixed effect is due to the fact that although the intercept may differ among 
firms, each firm does not vary overtime, that is time-variant. This is the major 
assumption under this model i.e. while the intercept are cross-sectional variant, they 
are time variant. 
In the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) regression model, the unobserved effect 
is brought explicitly into the model. If we define a set of dummy variables Ai, where 
Ai is equal to 1 in the case of an observation relating to firm i and 0 otherwise, the 
model can be written 
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3.3.2. Random Effect Model 
Random effects regression model is subject to two conditions: the first condition is 
that it is possible to treat each of the first unobserved Zp variables as being drawn 
randomly from a given distribution. This may well be the case if the individual 
observations constitute a random sample from a given population. 
If:
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where: µit = ∞i + Eit 
The unobserved effect has been dealt with by subsuming it into the disturbance term. 
The second condition is that the Zp variables are distributed independently of all the 
Xj variables. If this is not the case, ∞, and here µ, will not be uncorrelated with Xj 
variables and the random effects estimation will be biased and inconsistent. 
 
4. Result and Analysis  
The Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression estimation technique was 
adopted in carrying out the analysis of the study. It would be recalled that there are 
five (5) firms (cross sections) and there are five (5) variables in each model such as 
return on asset (ROA), Ownership structure (OWNSTR), Board size (BSIZE), Board 
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independence (BIND) and Board gender diversity (BGD) for model 1 and return on 
equity (ROE), Ownership structure (OWNSTR), Board size (BSIZE), Board 
independence (BIND) and Board gender diversity (BGD) for model 2. Hence, the 
study analyzed the relationship between return on asset and return on equity (ROA 
and ROE the dependent variables) and four (4) explanatory variables Ownership 
structure (OWNSTR), Board size (BSIZE), Board independence (BIND) and Board 
gender diversity (BGD) for model one and two respectively.  
4.1. Pooled OLS Regression Model  
In the pooled OLS regression model, the study pulled all the 25 observations and run 
the regression for the two models, neglecting the cross section and time series nature 
of data. The result of the pooled OLS regression model is presented in Table 4.1a 
and 4.1b: 
Table 4.1 a & b. Extract from the Pooled OLS Regression Models Result 
 
Source: Author’s Computation from EViews 7 
Estimated Pooled OLS Regression Models 
BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROA *046940.0*188601.0*660970.0*024204.0560685.0   (4.1) 
BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROE *281743.0*511964.0*557490.0*646366.0543892.5   (4.2) 
The results of the pooled OLS regression models for the two periods are shown in 
Table 4.1a &b where all the variables, except board gender diversity BGD, depict an 
insignificant result in model 1. It is evident from the estimated pooled regression 
result of Table 4.1a that all the parameters were positive and significant except BGD 
variable which has an insignificant positive effect on return on asset. Hence, it can 
be concluded that OWNSTR, BSIZE and BIND affect ROA significantly by 0.02%, 
0.66% and 0.18% while BGD affect ROA insignificantly by 0.04%. Looking at 
model two presented in the Table 4.1b, all the variables are positively and 
significantly related to the dependent variable ROE, however BSIZE was statistically 
insignificant at 5% while OWNSTR, BIND and BGD were significant at 5% level of 
significant. Hence, it is inferred that OWNSTR, BIND and BGD significantly affect 
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ROE by 0.64%, 0.51% and 0.28% while BSIZE insignificantly affect ROE by 
0.55%. 
The R2 coefficient is (79.8%) in the case of model two in Table 4.1b. On the other 
hand, the R2 value of 88.9% is quite high in the model one of Table 4.1a. These 
values connote the degree of variation of the dependent variable as explained by the 
explanatory variable. However, the models are statistically significant in its overall 
looking at the significance of the F-statistics from it probability value. Nonetheless, 
since we assume that all the five (5) firms are the same, which normally does not 
happen, hence, we cannot accept this model because all the firms are not the same.  
However, the major problem with this model is that it does not distinguish between 
the various firms that that the study considered. Conversely, by combining 3 banks 
and 2 non-banks, the study denied heterogeneity or individuality that may exist 
among the five firms selected for analysis in the study, therefore, it is imperative to 
carry out the remaining two regression models. 
4.1.2. Fixed Effect or LSDV Model 
The fixed effect or LSDV model allows for heterogeneity or individuality among the 
five firms by allowing having its own intercept value. The term fixed effect is due to 
the fact that although the intercept may differ across firms, but intercept does not 
vary over time, that is, it is time invariant. 
The result of the fixed effect model is presented in Table 4.2a and 4.2b. 
Table 4.2. a&b. Extract from the Fixed Effect or LSDV Regression Model Result 
 
Source: Author’s Computation from EViews 7 
Estimated Pooled OLS Regression Models (Fixed Effect Model) 
BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROA *183129.0*020797.0*202749.2*165987.0788012.2   (4.3) 
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BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROE *017408.0*916927.0*252995.0*849018.7092743.0   (4.4) 
Presented in Table 4.2a and Table 4.2b are the fixed effect regression models for the 
two models under consideration. It can be seen in the estimated models that all the 
variables depict conflicting coefficients in the two models. In another word, the 
result of the model one of Table 4.2a connote that OWNSTR has an insignificant 
negative effect on return on asset which implied that OWNSTR reduced ROA by 
0.16%. BSIZE has an insignificant positive effect on ROA which implied that BSIZE 
insignificantly increased ROA by 2.20%. More so, BIND and BGD have positive 
and significant effect on ROA, this effect implied that BIND and BGD increased 
ROA by 0.02% and 0.18% respectively. On the other hand, in the model two of Table 
4.2b, OWNSTR and BSIZE have negative effect on ROE which indicated that 
OWNSTR and BSIZE negatively affected ROE by -7.84% and 0.25% respectively 
however, OWNSTR appeared to be significant while BSIZE remained insignificant. 
BIND has a significant positive effect on ROE while BGD has an insignificant 
positive effect on ROE. However, the result implied that BIND and BDG have an 
increasing effect on ROE by 0.91% and 0.01% respectively. Therefore, 1% change 
in the value of each of the variables will either increase or decrease the value of the 
dependent variables depending on their respective coefficient signs. The R2 values 
of 96.3% and 95.6% in both periods are quite high. In its overall, the model in Table 
4.2 a&b are statistically significant owing to the statistical significance of its F-
statistics. The third model (random effect model) will hence be analysed. 
4.1.3. Random Effect Model  
The random effect model assumed that all the five (5) firms have a common mean 
value for the intercept. The result of the random effect model is presented in Table 
4.3a and Table 4.3b. 
Table 4.3. a&b. Extract from the Random Effect Regression Model Result 
 
Source: Author’s Computation from EViews 7 
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Estimated Pooled OLS Regression Models (Random Effect Model) 
BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROA *017408.0*188601.0*259995.0*047875.0092743.0   
(4.5) 
BGDBINDBSIZEOWNSTRROE *281743.0*511964.0*557490.0*646366.0588313.0  - 
(4.6) 
The estimated random effect models are presented in equation 4.5 and 4.6. The result 
showed that the replica of the direction of estimates in the preceding models 
estimated earlier in the pooled OLS regression as well as the fixed effect regression 
model where the variables tends to have conflicting direction of effect on the 
dependent variables in both models. Specifically, the model one of Table 4.3a 
explored that OWNSTR and BSIZE have an insignificant negative effect on ROA, as 
a result OWNSTR, BSIZE and BGD have reduction effect on ROA with about -
0.04%, -0.25% and -0.01% while only BIND have a direct and significant effect on 
ROA with about 0.18% increase. Evidence from the model two of Table 4.3b showed 
that all the variables i.e. OWNSTR, BSIZE, BIND and BGD have direct and 
significant effect on ROE with 0.64%, 0.55%, 0.51% and 0.28%. This result is 
directly at variance with what was obtainable in the model one of Table 4.3a. It is 
however evident that, the R2 values of 95.6% and 79.8% imply the variation in the 
dependent variable as explained by the independent variables while the remaining 
percentage is ascribed to the stochastic error term. The random effect model is 
statistically significant in its overall owing to the significance of the model’s F-
statistic value. To ascertaining the appropriateness of either of these estimated 
models, the study employed the Hausman Test to know which of the models to 
accept for analytical and policy implication purpose in each of the periods under 
consideration; this is the model that was analysed in explaining the disparity or not 
between the two models. 
4.1.4. Hausman Test 
Having estimated the three models above; the study decided on the best model to 
accept. To check it, the study employed the Hausman Test to check which model is 
suitable to accept.  
Hausman Test Hypothesis: 
H0: Random effect model is appropriate  
H1: Fixed effect model is appropriate  
NB: If the probability value is statistically significant, the study shall use fixed 
effect mode, otherwise, random effect model. 
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Table 4.4. Extract from the Hasuman Test Results 
 ROA (2013-2017) ROE (2013-2017) 
Test 
Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-
section 
random 2.935429 4 0.5047 52.599465 4 0.5510 
Source: Author’s Computation from EViews 7 
Looking at the Chi-square values of the cross-section random in Table 4.4, the 
probability values of the chi-square statistics are 0.50% and 0.55% for the model one 
and two respectively, these values are greater than 5%, this implies that, the study 
cannot reject the null hypotheses; rather, the study accept the null hypotheses, hence, 
the random effect model is the appropriate model to accept for analytical raison 
d'être. Nonetheless, looking at the estimated random effect models in both models 
as shown in Table 4.3, it is evident that all the explanatory variables that is, 
ownership structure (OWNSTR), board size (BSIZE), board independence (BIND) 
and board gender diversity (BGD) have significant positive effect on return on equity 
(firm performance) in the second model while only board independence was 
significant in the model one, leaving other variables that is, OWNSTR, BSIZE and 
BGD to be negatively related with return on asset. Hence, OWNSTR, BSIZE and 
BGD negatively affected ROA by –0.04%, -0.25% and -0.01% and BIND have 
positive effect on ROA with 0.18%. The second model therefore implied that 
OWNSTR, BSIZE, BIND and BGD influenced ROE positively by 0.64%, 0.55%, 
0.51% and 0.28% respectively. The overall significance of the entire models 
connotes that the explanatory variables are able to explain the behavior and direction 
of relationships of the dependent variables as inherent in the estimated models. The 
econometric criteria of Durbin Watson test of autocorrelation in the study showed 
that the estimated result is free from the problem of autocorrelation in the model one 
while the autocorrelation test is inconclusive in the model two.  
4.2. Discussion of Finding 
In other to establish an empirical significance of the results and analysis in the study, 
this section briefly illustrate the discussion and policy implication of the study’s 
results and analysis as earlier discussed in the preceding sections. From the accepted 
random regression shown in Table 4.3. a&b, it was shown that all the explanatory 
variable have significant effect on firm performance in the second model while only 
BIND has significant effect on firm performance in the first model.  
The implication is that, as firm maintain sizeable number of internal and external 
directors, the financial performance of the firm is expected to increase. The studies 
of Mehran (1995); Pinteris (2002) confirmed this standpoint. However, Laing and 
Weir (1999) play down the importance of this argument by stressing the importance 
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of business experience and entrepreneurship. It can be deduced that as companies 
maintain appropriate board size, the financial performance of the firm would 
increase. This finding corroborates the result of Abdulazeez et al. (2016) that larger 
board size is better for corporate performance than smaller board size because in 
larger board, members have a wide range of expertise to help make better decisions 
and are also difficult for a powerful CEO to dominate. Also, it is in consistent with 
Osisioma et al., (2015); Adekunle and Aghedo (2014) and Abdulazeez et al., (2016) 
who concluded that corporate governance have significant effect on firm 
performance in Nigeria.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The effect of a good and efficient corporate governance practice is the board of 
directors (firm’s management) who guarantees that the stakeholders’ interests are 
not put in danger (Hashanah & Mazlina in Adewoyin, 2012). Probity, transparency 
and accountability are apparatus of corporate governance that would assist firms 
increase depositors’, shareholders’, investors’ and other stakeholders’ trust.  
From the study, it was concluded that board independence have positive effect on 
firm performance measured by ROA while other variables, that is, board size, 
ownership structure and board gender diversity have negative effect on firm 
performance leading to low performance of firm. The negative effect inferred that 
dominance of family owned businesses existed in Nigerian firms. As a result, when 
family dominance over board matters happens, it showed the weakness of corporate 
governance apparatus. Also by the results reached related to the board members, it 
is concluded that investors in Nigeria are less protected. Evident from the study also 
revealed that board size, board independence, ownership structure and board gender 
diversity have significant effect on firm performance measured by ROE. The study 
concluded that corporate governance improves stakeholders’ confidence and aided 
the development of business in the long run. Consequent upon the discussion of 
findings the study concluded that corporate governance have significant effect on 
firm performance in Nigeria. Based on the findings of the research, the following 
recommendations were made: Firms should endeavour that board members are 
independent that is, to ensure that board of directors are not in any way employed 
into the firms; size of the board (membership) should be increased but not exceeding 
the maximum number specified by the code of corporate governance for firms; 
Government should enact laws on institutional and governmental ownership to serve 
as control mechanism and in the long run enhance firm performance;  
Female directors should be given a reasonable mandatory quota on board 
membership in order to enhance cross fertilization of technical know-how. 
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